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Abstract
In this paper we propose a dynamic model of Limit Order Book (LOB). The main feature
of our model is that the shape of the LOB is determined endogenously by an expected utility
function via a competitive equilibrium argument. Assuming zero resilience, the resulting
equilibrium density of the LOB is random, nonlinear, and time inhomogeneous. Consequently,
the liquidity cost can be defined dynamically in a natural way.
We next study an optimal execution problem in our model. We verify that the value func-
tion satisfies the Dynamic Programming Principle, and is a viscosity solution to the correspond-
ing Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation which is in the form of an integro-partial-differential
quasi-variational inequality. We also prove the existence and analyze the structure of the
optimal strategy via a verification theorem argument, assuming that the PDE has a classical
solution.
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1
1 Introduction
The effect of the liquidity of a security asset, both short term and long term, has been noticed
by practitioners and researchers alike for quite some time. Tremendous efforts have been made
in modeling the liquidity costs as well as its impact on the security prices (see, e.g., [4, 2, 8, 15],
to mention a few). In a frictionless market model (Black-Scholes’ framework for example), one
assumes that the securities can be bought or sold at a quote price regardless of the trade size
and the actual availability of the securities. But this is far from being realistic. In practice, the
parity between the supply and demand often causes the actual trade price to deviate from the
fundamental price, leading to the bid-ask spread. As a consequence, some extra cost has to be
paid in actual trading, especially when the volume of the trade is relatively large compared to the
existing liquidity on the market.
Unlike the quote driven market models, in which a market maker sets the price upon which all
the trades are made, an “order-driven” market model is one that reflects more of the reality. In
such a model, both buyers and sellers are allowed to be “patient” in the sense that they submit the
“orders” containing the amount of the shares and the prices at which they are willing to buy or sell.
These orders are called limit orders. Unlike the “market orders”, which are executed immediately
at the “market price” whenever there is sufficient liquidity, the limit orders are executed only
when an opposite order with the matching price comes in. Obviously, limit orders are usually not
executed immediately, a limit order book (LOB) is thus formed. Intuitively, a reasonable model
of an LOB must contain the following basic elements:
(i) The best ask/bid price (the frontier of the sell/buy LOB);
(ii) The shape of the LOB (the volumes of the orders at each price).
There have been many papers in the literature trying to model and analyze the movement
of the LOB (cf., e.g., [11, 13, 14, 16] and the references cited therein), as well as the optimal
execution/liquidation problems in which a large trader needs to acquire/liquidate a certain amount
of stocks in a given time horizon, with the minimal cost (see, e.g., [3, 12, 15]). Apart from the
usual factors such as the fundamental price (or mid-price) and the liquidity (often refer to the
total amount of shares available for trading), an important characteristic of an LOB is its “shape”,
that is, the “density” function of the LOB. This is particularly the case when the liquidity cost
is among the main concerns. However, in most of the existing works the shape of the LOB is
assumed to be exogenously given, either in the simple “block-shaped” (cf. e.g., [4, 15]), or in a
general given shape that is supposed to be determined by empirical studies (cf. e.g., [3, 2, 17] and
the references cited therein). However, such an assumption obviously lacks the ability to adapt
to the changes of market movement, especially when the underlying price is volatile within the
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concerned time horizon. A more ideal model would be such that the shape of the LOB could be
determined endogenously, through some more basic market factors such as the bid-ask spread,
the fundamental prices (the “mid price”, for example), and the market liquidity. This paper is
an attempt in this direction.
To simplify the argument in this paper we shall consider only the “sell” side of the LOB,
namely we assume that all the buyers are “impatient” in the sense that they only submit the
market orders so there is no “buy” side LOB. Our first objective is to develop a dynamic model for
the LOB whose shape is determined via the movement of the fundamental price, the instantaneous
trading size, as well as the liquidity. The guiding principle of our model comes from the idea of
equilibrium distribution, initiated by Rosu [16]. Roughly speaking, we assume that there exists a
competitive equilibrium among all the prices in the LOB. The existence of such an equilibrium
can be heuristically justified as a balance between the expected sell price and the cost of waiting
(for the order to be executed). The equilibrium could be affected by the fundamental price, the
execution of orders, and the arrival of the new orders, etc., and when an existing equilibrium is
broken, every seller in LOB will reposition until an equilibrium is reached. It should be noted
that this equilibrium is “ competitive” in the sense that one trader’s deviation will be stopped by
others’ immediate undercutting. In other words, when the market is under monopoly, we should
allow the distribution to behave differently. In this paper we assume that the time of reaching new
equilibrium is negligible, that is, the impact has zero duration, or “zero resilience”, for simplicity.
We should note, however, that the issue of resilience is interesting in its own right (see, e.g., [4]
and also [1, 2]), but this is not the main purpose of this paper.
Mathematically, we shall assume that the equilibrium density process takes the form µ∗t =
µ∗(t,Xt, Qt, y), y ≥ p0, where p0 is the lowest (selling) price, X is the fundamental value of the
asset, and Q is the total volume of the LOB. We also assume that the equilibrium is “quantified’
by a common expected utility on each price, which depends on the fundamental price and the
total liquidity, and is denoted by U(X,Q). Our main premise is that, after each trade with size
α ∈ [0, Q], the following two identities must hold:∫ p(α)
p0
µ∗(X,Q, y)dy = α,
1
α
∫ p(α)
p0
yµ∗(X,Q, y)dy = U(X,Q− α). (1.1)
Here the first equality is self-evident: p(α) = p(α,X,Q) ≥ p0 is the price in LOB at which the
accumulated volume of sell limit orders between p0 and p(α) is exactly equal to α; whereas the
second equality means that the average price sold should be equal to U(X,Q− α), the expected
utility for the remaining LOB (a more detailed argument will be given in §3). Using the equations
in (1.1) we will be able to solve explicitly the process µ∗ in terms of U , and from which we will
define the liquidity cost, and argue that, modulo a term that is of order α2, where α is the trading
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size, it is linear (although time inhomogeneous) in α. More importantly, once we obtain the
density function of the LOB, we can then evaluate the liquidity cost. We show that, under mild
technical conditions, the average price (including liquidity cost) exactly coincides with the supply
curve in sense of Cetin-Jarrow-Protter [8].
Our second goal of this paper is to consider an optimal execution problem. That is, finding
an optimal strategy of purchasing a large block of shares within a prescribed time duration [0, T ]
with a minimum cost. Such a problem has been studied by many authors (cf. e.g., [2, 4, 6, 17],
and the references cited therein), but with the endogenously given shape of LOB, our problem
seems to be new. We shall consider only two types of actions: the (buying) action of the large
investor self, and an aggregated action of all the other investors, which is modeled as a compound
Poisson process, representing all incoming limit sell orders, canceled orders, and the market buy
orders. In other words, without the buying action of the investor, whose accumulated purchase
will be described by an increasing process, the movement of the total available shares in the LOB
is a continuous time pure jump process. We then show that the Bellman Principle of dynamic
programming holds in this case, and the value function is a viscosity solution of the resulting
HJB quasi-variational inequality (QVI). Finally, in the case that the QVI has a classical solution,
we shall analyze the optimal strategy by proving a verification theorem. It is noted that the
continuous (or inaction) region in our model may not be simply connected, and as a consequence
the optimal strategy may contain multiple (even infinitely many) jumps.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2 we give the necessary technical background
and describe the basic elements of the model. In §3 we introduce the notion of equilibrium dis-
tribution, and analyze some important quantities that can be derived endogenously from such
distribution. These in particular include bid-ask spread and the liquidity cost that play the fun-
damental role in our optimal execution problem. In §4 we introduce the optimal execution problem
and study its various equivalent expressions. In §5 and §6 we prove the dynamic programming
principle, derive the HJB equation, and prove that the value function is a viscosity solution to the
corresponding HJB equation. Finally, §7 is devoted to the construction of an optimal strategy, in
the case that the HJB equation has a classical solution.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper we assume that all the randomness comes from a complete probability
space (Ω,F ,P) on which are defined a standard Brownian motion W = {Wt : t ≥ 0}, and a
standard Poisson process N = {Nt :≥ 0} with intensity λ. In what follows the Brownian motion
W represents the market noise that drives the fundamental value (or mid-price) of the underlying
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stock, and the Poisson process N represents the frequency of the incoming limit orders. Therefore
it is reasonable to assume that W and N are independent. We shall denote FW = {FWt : t ≥ 0}
and FN = {FNt : t ≥ 0} to be the natural filtration generated by W and N , respectively.
Throughout the paper, we denote τ0 := 0 and let 0 < τ1 < τ2 < · · · be the jump times of N .
We consider a finite time horizon [0, T ]. For simplicity, we assume that there is only one
stock traded in an order driven market, and the interest rate is 0. We first give the mathematical
description of the basic elements involved in our model.
1. Fundamental Price. We assume that the underlying stock has a fundamental value (or
mid-price) which is known to the public. But the market price deviates away from it, due to the
possible illiquidity, which leads to the bid-ask spread. Since the fundamental value only affects
our model as a source of randomness, we simply assume that it is a diffusion, and satisfies the
following stochastic differential equation (SDE):
Xt = x+
∫ t
0
b(s,Xs)ds +
∫ t
0
σ(s,Xs)dWs, t ≥ 0, (2.1)
where b and σ satisfy the following standing assumptions:
(H1) (i) b(·, ·) and σ(·, ·) are deterministic functions, continuous in t, and uniformly Lipschitz
continuous in x, with a common uniform Lipschitz constant L > 0.
(ii) x > 0, σ(t, 0) = 0, and b(t, 0) ≥ 0.
Remark 2.1 It is clear that the assumption (H1) guarantees the well-posedness of the the SDE
(2.1), and solution satisfies Xt > 0 for all t ≥ 0, P-a.s. The continuity of b and σ in t is mainly for
the viscosity property of the value function in §6 below. For notational simplicity, in this paper
we assume W is 1-dimensional, but all the results can be extended to higher dimensional case.
Moreover, we may even allow b and σ to be random, and all the results in §4 and §5 will still
hold true, after obvious modification. However, in this case the HJB equation in Section 6 will
become a backward stochastic PDE and the associated path dependent PDE. We refer to [10] for
the related theory.
2. The Limit Order Book (LOB). We assume that there are patient and impatient investors
in the market, and they put different bid and/or ask prices to either liquidate or purchase the
given stock based on their preferences (see §3 for more discussion on this). Since in this paper
we consider the optimal execution problem for purchasing the stock, only the sell side LOB will
be relevant. We thus assume in what follows that all the buyers are impatient and only make
“market orders” (i.e., buying whatever is available on the market), and consequently there is no
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“buy side” LOB. Moreover, we isolate one particular investor, referred as the investor, who will
carry out the optimal execution problem later.
We shall assume that the movement of the LOB depends solely on the investment activities,
namely the investor herself, and all other investors (buyers and sellers). For simplicity, we assume
that the activities of other investors are aggregated as a large investor whose investment activities
is described by a compound Poisson process Yt =
∑Nt
i=1 Λi, t ≥ 0, where {Λi}∞i=1 is a sequence
of i.i.d. random variables with distribution ν. We shall assume E{|Λi|} < ∞. We should note
that the large investor is allowed to make both (buy and sell) limit orders and market orders, and
can also cancel orders. Thus Λi’s will take values in R (i.e., ∆Yt < 0 is possible). It is useful to
introduce the following filtration: F = FW ⊗ FY = {FWt ∨ FYt : t ≥ 0}, which will be the basic
information source allowed in our execution problem. We notice that FN ⊂ FY ⊂ F.
3. The Inventory Process. We assume that the investor is trying to purchase a certain number,
say K, shares of the given stock within a given time horizon [0, T ], and denote the accumulated
number of shares up to time t ∈ [0, T ] by pit. Then clearly pi = {pit : t ≥ 0} is an increasing
process, and we assume that it is F-predictable. Note that, with this assumption, all the jumps
times of pi is predictable, and consequently ∆piτi∆Yτi = 0, since all jump times of N (and of Y )
are totally inaccessible. In fact, for practical reason we could, and will, assume that N and Y
have ca`dla`g paths but pi is ca`gla`d, and then naturally we have
∆pit∆Yt := (pit+ − pit)(Yt − Yt−) = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s.
Note that with such a definition the investor can observe the jump of Y and immediately jump
afterwards. Clearly, each particular realization of pi could be considered as an execution strategy.
We thus define
A := {pi : pi is F-predictable, non-decreasing, has ca`gla`d paths, and piT ≤ K}. (2.2)
We can now describe the dynamics of the total number of shares of the stock in the (sell)
LOB, denoted by Q = {Qt : t ∈ [0, T ]}. We shall consider in this paper the simplest case in which
the dynamics of Q can be affected by only two factors: the order made by the investor herself,
pi, and the orders made by the other large investor (or the aggregated action by all other market
participants), Y . Then, it is readily seen that, for a given strategy pi ∈ A and initial inventory q,
the movement of Qpi := Qpi,q is determined by: Qpi0 := q, and
Qpit := Q
pi
τi
− (pit − piτi) for t ∈ (τi, τi+1); Qpiτi+1 := (Qpiτi+1− +∆Yτi+1)+. (2.3)
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Remark 2.2 (i) Qpi is ca`gla`d in each (τi, τi+1). However, at τi+1, Q
pi can have left and/or right
jumps. So Qpi has both left and right limits, but in general it is neither left continuous nor right
continuous on [0, T ].
(ii) When pi is continuous, which will be the case in most of the paper, Qpi is ca`dla`g.
We note from (2.3) that Qpiτi+1 ≥ 0. This is a natural constraint since the volume of the LOB
can never be negative. However, not all pi ∈ A will guarantee that the corresponding Qpit ≥ 0 for
all t ∈ [0, T ]. We thus consider the following admissible strategies: given q ≥ 0,
Aad(q) := {pi ∈ A : Qpi,qt ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s., where Qpi,q is defined by (2.3)}. (2.4)
Throughout the paper, we shall denote
R+ := (0,∞), R¯+ := [0,∞), O := R+ × [0,K)× R+, O¯ := R+ × [0,K]× R¯+. (2.5)
We remark that we do not take the closure for the first R+ in O¯.
3 Equilibrium Distribution
In this section we introduce the notion of “equilibrium density” of the LOB, one of the most
important ingredients in our model. Our idea follows from that of Rosu’s [16], which we now
describe. We assume that every seller comes into the market with the same amount of information
(this is different from the asymmetric information assumptions, cf. [5]). Each seller sets his/her
ask price based on the personal preference, which is the combination of the expected return of
the order and the possible lost value (or cost) due to, say, the waiting time for the order to be
executed. In an equilibrium we assume that every seller will have the same “expected return” (or
“expected utility”) of the order, which we denote by U(X,Q), where X is the fundamental value
of the stock and Q is the total number shares available.
The existence of such equilibrium could be argued as follows. Suppose two sellers do not
believe that they have the same expected return, then one of them (usually the one with lower
expected return) is going to cancel his/her limit order and resubmit it to the market with a
different ask price in exchange for a higher expected return. Then every seller in the market
will do the same until an equilibrium is reached. We should point out that such an equilibrium
approach only works when there is sufficient competition in the market. In fact, when the market
is under monopoly, we should not expect the distribution to behave like this.
Given the expected return U(X,Q), we now introduce the concept of “equilibrium density”.
Recall that the density function of an LOB is a non-negative function µ(y) ≥ 0, ∀y ≥ 0, such that
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µ(y) = 0, for y < p0, where p0 ≥ X is the lowest (best) ask price, and that∫ ∞
p0
µ(y)dy = Q. (3.1)
We note that if µ(y) ≡ µ, p0 ≤ y ≤ p0 + Q/µ, is a constant, then the LOB is said to have
a “block shape” (see, e.g., [4] and [15]). Another way to study the problem is to assume the
“shape” of the LOB is given exogenously (see, e.g., [2, 17]). Our main idea is to show that the
shape function is determined by the following simple facts. Assume that a (large) market buy
order comes in and α-shares of the stock were purchased, where α ∈ (0, Q]. We assume that the
lowest portion of α shares in the LOB is consumed. Thus, if we denote p(0) = p(0,X,Q), to be
the lowest ask price, then we can find p(α) > p(0) such that∫ p(α)
p(0)
µ(y)dy = α. (3.2)
On the other hand, we assume that, in equilibrium, the average price of the sold block should
have the same expected return of the remaining orders in the LOB, which has a total of Q − α
shares after the purchase. In other words, we assume that: for any α that 0 ≤ α ≤ Q,
1
α
∫ p(α)
p(0)
yµ(y)dy = U(X,Q− α). (3.3)
Now taking derivative with respect to α in (3.2) and (3.3) we obtain:

µ(p(α))p′(α) = 1;
µ(p(α))p′(α)p(α) = U(X,Q− α)− α ∂U
∂x2
(X,Q− α).
(3.4)
Solving two equations in (3.4) we have:
p(α) = U(X,Q− α)− α∂U
∂Q
(X,Q− α); (3.5)
µ(p(α)) =
1
p′(α)
=
(
α
∂2U
∂Q2
(X,Q− α)− 2∂U
∂Q
(X,Q − α)
)−1
. (3.6)
We note that, by setting α = 0 in (3.5),
p(0,X,Q) = U(X,Q). (3.7)
That is, the “frontier” of the LOB is exactly the representative of the equilibrium, as expected.
On the other hand, since the function α 7→ p(α) is obviously non-decreasing, we can assume
further that it is invertible and denote h(y) = p−1(y), then (3.6) becomes
µ(y) =
1
p′(h(y))
=
(
h(y)
∂2U
∂Q2
(X,Q− h(y)) − 2∂U
∂Q
(X,Q− h(y))
)−1
. (3.8)
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Namely, the equilibrium density µ := µX,Q can be explicitly derived, as long as U(X,Q) is given.
We should remark here that the modeling of the expected return function U(X,Q) is itself an
interesting and challenging problem. For example, in [16] such an expected return function was
obtained explicitly by solving a recursive difference equation. Also, in a slightly different setting,
the relationship between the bid-ask spread and the liquidity was considered by Avellaneda-
Stoikov [5], in which an argument of indifference pricing was applied to construct the return
function U . In what follow we shall assume the existence of such a function U , and furthermore,
based on the discussion above, we make the following assumptions.
(H2) The expected utility function U : R+ × R¯+ 7→ R+ enjoys the following properties:
(i) U is non-decreasing in x, and ∂QU =
∂U
∂Q
< 0, ∂2QU =
∂2U
∂Q2
> 0.
(ii) U is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in (x, q), with Lipschitz constant L > 0.
Remark 3.1 (i) By (3.6), the properties of U in q guarantees that p′(α) > 0, for all 0 ≤ α ≤ Q,
which leads further to the existence of its inverse so that the formula (3.8) makes sense. Moreover,
by (3.7) we see that the function p(0) = p(0,X,Q) is uniform Lipschitz for (X,Q) ∈ R+ × R¯+.
This fact will be frequently used in our discussion.
(ii) (H2) obviously does not render the function U a true “utility function” in either variable.
In fact, the assumption (H2)-(i), which guarantees the positivity of the density function µ (see
(3.6)), implies that it is decreasing and convex in Q, hence a “cost function” on Q in a usual
sense. Of course, it would be reasonable to assume that U is concave in X, hence a utility on the
price, but we do not need such an assumption in the rest of our discussion.
(iii) In practice, it is natural to assume further that U(x, q) ≥ x, or limq→∞ U(x, q) = x. The
latter implies that the liquidity premium vanishes as the supply goes to infinity. But technically
we do not need them in this paper.
We conclude this section by observing that, given the density function µ = µX,Q, the cost for
buying α shares of stock can be easily calculated as
C(X,Q,α) :=
∫ p(α)
p(0)
yµX,Q(y)dy = αU(X,Q− α), (3.9)
where the last equality is due to (3.3). From this we obtain that
liquidity cost = C(X,Q,α) − αX = [p(0) −X]α+
∫ p(α)
p(0)
[y − p(0)]µX,Q(y)dy. (3.10)
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Clearly, we can see that the liquidity cost consists of a linear part (with respect to the trade size
α), due to the bid-ask spread; and a higher order part that is determined by the “shape” of the
LOB. More precisely, assume for example p′(α) <∞, then we can easily derive from (3.10) that
C(X,Q,α) = p(0)α +O(α2). (3.11)
In particular, if we consider a purchase strategy pi = {pit}, then (3.11) amounts to saying that
C(Xt, Q
pi
t ,∆pit) = p(0)∆pit + O((∆pit)
2). Consequently, for a continuous strategy pic = {pict , t ∈
[0, T ]}, the following calculation of the total cost will be useful in the rest of the paper:∫ t
0
C(Xs, Q
pic
s , dpi
c
s) =
∫ t
0
p(0,Xs, Q
pic
s )dpi
c
s =
∫ t
0
U(Xs, Q
pic
s )dpi
c
s. (3.12)
Remark 3.2 The following obversion is worth noting. Assume that the function U is sufficiently
regular, then by (3.3) we see that, for each α ∈ [0, Q], the process of “average price” of the stock
counting liquidity cost, defined by
S(t, ω, α)
△
=
1
α
C(Xt(ω), Qt(ω), α) = U(Xt(ω), Qt(ω)− α), (t, ω) ∈ [0,∞) × Ω,
is a semi-martingale. Furthermore, the assumption (H2) implies that it is convex and increasing
with respect to the trade size α. In other words, the process S is exactly the supply curve in the
sense of Cetin-Jarrow-Protter [8](!).
4 Optimal Execution Problem
We are now ready to introduce the main objective of the paper: the optimal execution problem.
Consider the scenario when an investor would like to purchase K shares of the stock within a
prescribed time duration [0, T ]. Given initial inventory q ≥ 0 and a purchase strategy pi ∈ Aad(q),
we consider the following cost functional:
J(pi) = E
{ ∑
0≤s<T
C(Xs, Q
pi
s ,∆pis) +
∫ T
0
U(Xs, Q
pi
s )dpi
c
s + g(XT ,K − piT )
}
, (4.1)
where pic denotes the continuous part of pi, and g : R+ × [0,K] → R+ is the terminal penalty
function. Clearly, the first term is the cost for the jump part of pi, and the second term is the
cost of the continuous part of pi. The value function is thus
V0 := V0(q) := inf
pi∈Aad(q)
J(pi). (4.2)
We shall assume that the terminal penalty function g satisfies the following assumption:
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(H3) (i) g is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in (x, y), with Lipschitz constant L > 0.
(ii) For fixed x, g is increasing and convex in y. Moreover, g(x, 0) = 0 and g(x, y) ≥ U(x, 0)y.
Remark 4.1 In the case piT < K, one is forced to purchase the remaining amount of shares
y := K − piT at time T , regardless the liquidity. The terminal (penalty) g(x, y) ≥ U(x, 0)y for
y ≥ 0 amounts to saying that this price would be more expensive than the highest market price
U(x, 0), the price with zero liquidity. Furthermore, by (H3)-(ii) we see that g(x, y) − g(x, y′) ≥
U(x, 0)(y − y′) for 0 < y′ < y. Therefor if the final inventory is Q, and the investor needs to
purchase a total of y shares, but decides to buy 0 < y′ ≤ y∧Q from LOB right before T and buys
the remaining y − y′ using the penalty price, then his total cost would be: recall (3.9),
C(x,Q, y′) + g(x, y − y′) = U(x,Q− y′)y′ + g(x, y − y′) ≤ U(x, 0)y′ + g(x, y − y′) ≤ g(x, y).
This again shows that it is disadvantageous to purchase everything at the terminal time.
We now introduce two alternative expressions for V0 to facilitate the future discussion. First,
we define the set of continuous strategies by
A
c
ad(q) := {pi ∈ Aad(q) : t 7→ pit is continuous, P-a.s.}. (4.3)
Clearly, if pi ∈ A cad(q), then Qpi is ca`dla`g and C(Xt, Qpit ,∆pit) = 0. We thus define

J0(pi) := E
{∫ T
0
U(Xs, Q
pi
s )dpis + g(XT ,K − piT )
}
; pi ∈ Aad(q);
V 00 := inf
pi∈A c
ad
(q)
J0(pi).
(4.4)
Next, recall that p(0,X,Q) = U(X,Q) is decreasing in Q. Thus, for 0 < α ≤ Q, it holds that
C(X,Q,α) = αU(X,Q − α) =
∫ α
0
U(X,Q− α)du ≥
∫ α
0
U(X,Q− u)du =: D(X,Q,α). (4.5)
We now replace C(· · · ) by D(· · · ) in (4.1) and define

J1(pi) := E
{ ∑
0≤s<T
D(Xs, Q
pi
s ,∆pis) +
∫ T
0
U(Xs, Q
pi
s )dpi
c
s + g(XT ,K − piT )
}
, pi ∈ Aad(q);
V 10 := inf
pi∈Aad(q)
J1(pi).
(4.6)
We note that since A cad(q) ⊆ Aad(q), it follows from (4.5) that V 10 ≤ V0 ≤ V 00 . Our main
observation is that the cost D(X,Q,α) can actually be approximated by continuous strategies,
thus these inequalities should all be equalities. We substantiate this in the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.2 Assume (H1)- (H3). Then, it holds that V 00 = V0 = V
1
0 .
Proof. Since V 10 ≤ V0 ≤ V 00 holds by definitions, we need only show that V 00 ≤ V 10 . To this
end, we fix arbitrary pi ∈ Aad(q) and ε > 0. We claim that
V 00 ≤ J1(pi) + ε. (4.7)
Indeed, for each m ∈ N, define τm0 := 0 and τmi+1 := inf{t > τmi : ∆pit ≥ 1m} ∧ T , i = 0, 1, · · · .
Since pi has right limits and the filtration F is right continuous, we see that τmi are F-stopping
times, τmi < τ
m
i+1 and ∆piτmi ≥ 1m whenever τmi < T . Define
pims := pi
c
s +
m2∑
i=1
∆piτmi 1{τmi ≤s}, s ∈ [0, T ]. (4.8)
Clearly, (pim)c = pic and pim ≤ pi. This implies that Qpim ≥ Qpi and thus pim ∈ Aad(q). Moreover,
since
∑m2
i=1∆piτmi ≥ m on {τmm2 < T}, we see that limµ→∞ P(τmm2 < T ) = 0. Consequently,
limm→∞ pi
m
T = piT , for all ω. Now by the monotonicity of U and (4.5), we have∫ T
0
U(Xs, Q
pim
s )d(pi
m)cs ≤
∫ T
0
U(Xs, Q
pi
s )dpi
c
s;
∑
0≤s≤T
D(Xs, Q
pim
s ,∆pi
m
s ) ≤
∑
0≤s≤T
D(Xs, Q
pi
s ,∆pi
m
s ) =
m2∑
i=1
D(Xτmi , Q
pi
τmi
,∆piτmi )
≤
∑
0≤s≤T
D(Xs, Q
pi
s ,∆pis).
Furthermore, since obviously one has limm→∞ g(XT ,K−pimT ) = g(XT ,K−piT ), we conclude that
limm→∞ J
1(pim) ≤ J1(pi), and thus there exists M such that
J1(piM ) ≤ J1(pi) + ε
2
. (4.9)
Next, recall again that ∆pis∆Ns = 0 and thus τi 6= τMj , P-a.s. for all i, j. Let δ > 0 be a small
number. For each i = 1, · · · ,M2, let ji be the smallest j such that τj > τMi . We remark that ji is
random and τji is still an F-stopping time. Define pi
M,δ recursively as follows. First, piM,δs := pics
for 0 ≤ s ≤ τM1 . For i = 1, · · · ,M2, denote τM,δi := [τMi + δ] ∧ τMi+1 ∧ τji , and define
piM,δs := pi
M,δ
τmi
+ [pics − picτMi ] +
s ∧ τM,δi − τMi
δ
∆piτM
i
, s ∈ (τMi , τMi+1], (4.10)
where we abuse the notation that τM
m2+1 := T . It is clear that pi
M,δ is continuous and piM,δ ≤ piM .
This implies that piM,δ ∈ A cad(q). Note that, by changing variable u := τMi + αδ (s− τMi ), we have
D(X,Q,α) =
∫ α
0
U(X,Q− u)du = α
δ
∫ τMi +δ
τMi
U(X,Q− α
δ
(s− τMi ))ds.
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On the other hand, it is not hard to check that, for s ∈ [τMi , τM,δi ], it holds that
Qpi
M,δ
s = Q
piM,δ
τMi
− [pics − picτMi ]−
s− τMi
δ
∆piτMi
≥ Qpi
τMi
− [pics − picτMi ]−
s− τMi
δ
∆piτMi
,
and that limδ→0 P(τ
M,δ
i = τ
M
i + δ) = 1, thus we have limδ→0 pi
M,δ
T = piT , P-a.s.
Now, by the monotonicity of U again and applying the dominated convergence theorm,
J0(piM,δ)− J1(piM )
= E
{∫ T
0
[U(Xs, Q
piM,δ
s )− U(Xs, Qpis )]dpics + [g(XT ,K − piM,δT )− g(XT ,K − piT )]
+
M2∑
i=1
[
∫ τM,δ
i
τMi
∆piτMi
δ
U(Xs, Q
piM,δ
s )ds −D(XτMi , Q
pi
τMi
,∆piτMi
)]
}
≤ E
{
[g(XT ,K − piM,δT )− g(XT ,K − piT )] +
M2∑
i=1
∫ τMi +δ
τMi
∆piτMi
δ
×
[
p
(
0,Xs, Q
pi
τMi
− (pics − picτMi )−
∆piτMi
δ
(s− τMi )
)− p(0,XτMi , QpiτMi −
∆piτMi
δ
(s − τMi )
)]
ds
}
≤ LE
{
|piM,δT − piT |+
piT
δ
M2∑
i=1
∫ τMi +δ
τM
i
[
|Xs −XτMi |+ |pi
c
s − picτMi |
]
ds
}
→ 0, as δ → 0.
Setting δ > 0 small enough such that J0(piM,δ) ≤ J1(piM ) + ε2 . By (4.9) and recalling that
piM,δ ∈ A cad(q), we prove (4.7), whence the theorem.
We conclude this section with a dynamic version of the value function V . Let (t, x, k, q) ∈
[0, T ]× O¯ (recall (2.5)), and let Xt,x be the solution to (2.1) on [t, T ] with Xt = x, a.s. Denote
A (t, k) := {pi : pi is F-predictable, ca`gla`d, non-decreasing, pit = k, and piT ≤ K}.
Denote τ t0 := t, and τ
t
i , i ≥ 1, being the jump times of N on (t, T ]. For any pi ∈ A (t, k), let

Qpis := Q
pi
τ ti
− (pis − piτ ti ) for s ∈ (τ ti , τ ti+1);
Qpit := q; Q
pi
τ ti+1
:= (Qpi
τ ti+1−
+∆Yτ ti+1)
+, i ≥ 1, (4.11)
and define
Aad(t, k, q) := {pi ∈ A (t, k) : Qpi,qs ≥ 0, s ∈ [t, T ],P-a.s.},
A cad(t, k, q) := {pi ∈ Aad(t, x, q) : pi is continuous, P-a.s.}.
(4.12)
By Theorem 4.2, we now define the dynamic value function V via two equivalent expressions:
V (t, x, k, q) := inf
pi∈A c
ad
(t,k,q)
J0(t, x, k, q;pi) = inf
pi∈Aad(t,k,q)
J1(t, x, k, q;pi), (4.13)
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where
J0(t, x, k, q;pi) := E
{∫ T
t
U(Xt,xs , Q
pi
s )dpis + g(X
t,x
T ,K − piT )
}
; (4.14)
J1(t, x, k, q;pi) := E
{ ∑
t≤s<T
D(Xt,xs , Q
pi
s ,∆pis) +
∫ T
t
U(Xt,xs , Q
pi
s )dpi
c
s + g(X
t,x
T ,K − piT )
}
.
Remark 4.3 (i) We note that the cost functional J0(t, x, k, q;pi) in (4.14) uses only continuous
strategies. It will facilitate the argument when we prove that the value function V is a viscosity
solution to the HJB equation in §5 and §6.
(ii) The cost functional J1(t, x, k, q;pi) will be useful when we investigate the existence of
optimal strategy in §7. Recall from Theorem 4.2 the inequality V 00 ≤ V0 ≤ V 10 . Thus an optimal
strategy, if exists, should also optimize J1. However, it is worth noting that cost function D(· · · )
does not have a practical meaning, as opposed to the cost function C(· · · ), and in practice it
cannot be implemented directly. Nevertheless, combining the approximations (4.8) and (4.10) in
the proof of Theorem 4.2, we will be able to find an implementable good approximation of optimal
strategy, as we shall see in §7.
5 Dynamic Programming Principle
In this section we verify some properties of the value function V and establish the Dynamic
Programming Principle (DPP). As we pointed out in Remark 4.3-(i), we shall consider the cost
functional J0. We begin by the regularity of V with respect to the “spatial variables” x, k, and
q, respectively.
Proposition 5.1 Assume (H1)-(H3). Then for each t ∈ [0, T ], the value function V (t, x, k, q)
is non-decreasing x, non-increasing in k and q, respectively, and uniformly Lipschitz continuous
with respect to (x, k, q) ∈ O¯.
Proof. We first check the properties in x. Assume x1 < x2. Then by the comparison theorem
of SDE, we have Xt,x1s ≤ Xt,x2s , for all t ≤ s ≤ T , P-a.s. Since both U and g are non-decreasing
and uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x, for any pi ∈ A cad(t, k, q) we see that
0 ≤ J0(t, x2, k, q;pi) − J0(t, x1, k, q;pi) (5.1)
= E
{∫ T
t
[U(Xt,x2s , Q
pi
s )− U(Xt,x1s , Qpis )]dpics + g(Xt,x2T ,K − piT )− g(Xt,x1T ,K − piT )
}
≤ CE
{
max
s∈[t,T ]
|Xt,x2s −Xt,x1s |
}
≤ C(x2 − x1).
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Switching the role of x1 and x2 we can easily deduce the Lipschitz property in x:
|V (t, x2, k, q)− V (t, x1, k, q)| ≤ C|x2 − x1|, ∀x1, x2 ∈ R. (5.2)
We next check the properties in k. Let 0 ≤ k1 < k2 ≤ K. For any pi ∈ A cad(t, k1, q), consider the
strategy pi′s := [k2+(pis− k1)]∧K, s ∈ [t, T ]. Clearly, pi′ ∈ A cad(t, k2, q), and it satisfies: pi′T ≥ piT ,
dpi′s ≤ dpis s ∈ [t, T ]. Consequently we have Qpi
′,q ≥ Qpi,q, J0(t, x, k2, q;pi′) ≤ J0(t, x, k1, q;pi),
and thus V (t, x, k2, q) ≤ V (t, x, k1, q). On the other hand, for any strategy pi ∈ A cad(t, k2, q), let
pi′ := pi − (k2 − k1) ∈ A cad(t, k1, q). Then Qpi
′,q = Qpi,q, and thus:
J0(t, x, k1, q;pi
′)− J0(t, x, k2, q;pi) = E
{
g(Xt,xT ,K − pi′T )− g(Xt,xT ,K − piT )
}
≤ C(k2 − k1). (5.3)
Similar to (5.2 this implies the uniform Lipschitz continuity of V in k.
It remains to prove the Lipschitz property in q. As before we first assume 0 ≤ q1 < q2. It is
clear that A cad(t, k, q1) ⊂ A cad(t, k, q2), and for any pi ∈ A cad(t, k, q1), we have Qpi,q1s ≤ Qpi,q2s . Then
J0(t, x, k, q1;pi) ≥ J0(t, x, k, q2;pi) for all pi ∈ A cad(t, k, q1), (5.4)
which leads to V (t, x, k, q1) ≥ V (t, x, k, q2). On the other hand, note that pi0 ≡ k ∈ A cad(t, k, q1).
For any pi ∈ A cad(t, k, q2), denote ∆Q := Qpi,q2 −Qk,q1 and τ := inf{s ≥ t : ∆Qs ≤ 0} ∧ T . Recall
(4.11), by induction on i one deduce easily that ∆Q is non-increasing on [t, τ ]. Then
piτ − pit =
∞∑
i=0
[piτ∧τ t
i+1
− piτ t
i
]1{τ t
i
<τ} =
∞∑
i=0
[∆Qτ t
i
−∆Qτ∧τ t
i+1
−]1{τ t
i
<τ}
≤ ∆Qt −∆Qτ− ≤ ∆Qt = q2 − q1. (5.5)
Now define pi′s := pi
0
s1[t,τ ](s) + [pis − piτ ]1(τ,T ]. Since pi is continuous and pi0 ≡ k, by (4.11) we see
that ∆Qτ = 0, as τ < T . Then Q
pi′,q1
s = Q
k,q1
s ≤ Qpi,q2s , s ∈ [t, τ ], and Qpi
′,q1
s = Q
pi,q2
s , s ∈ (τ, T ].
Namely pi′ ∈ A cad(t, k, q1). Moreover, (5.5) implies that 0 ≤ piT − pi′T = piτ − pit ≤ q2 − q1. Then
J0(t, x, k, q1;pi
′)− J0(t, x, k, q2;pi)
= E
{
−
∫ τ
t
U(Xt,xs , Q
pi,q2
s )dpis + g(X
t,x
T ,K − pi′T )− g(Xt,xT ,K − piT )
}
≤ CE{piT − pi′T} ≤ C(q2 − q1).
Since pi ∈ A cad(t, k, q2) is arbitrary, we obtain V (t, x, k, q1)− V (t, x, k, q2) ≤ C(q2− q1). Reversing
the role of q1 and q2 we obtain the Lipschitz property of V in q, proving the proposition.
We can now follow the standard arguments in the literature to establish the following simpler
from of dynamic programming principle, when the time increments are deterministic.
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Proposition 5.2 Assume (H1) - (H3). Then, for any 0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T and (x, k, q) ∈ O¯,
V (t1, x, k, q) = inf
pi∈A c
ad
(t1,k,q)
E
{∫ t2
t1
U(Xt1,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + V (t2,X
t1,x
t2
, pit2 , Q
pi,q
t2
)
}
. (5.6)
Proof. Let V˜ (t1, x, k, q) denote the right side of (5.6). We first show that V (t1, x, k, q) ≥
V˜ (t1, x, k, q). Indeed, for any pi ∈ A cad(t1, k, q), let p˜i denote the restriction of pi on [t2, T ]. Then
X
t2,X
t1,x
t2
s = X
t1,x
s , Q
p˜i,Q
pi,q
t2
s = Q
pi,q
s , for s ∈ [t2, T ]. In other words, p˜i ∈ A cad(t2, pit2 , Qpi,qt2 ). This
implies that
J0(t1, x, k, q;pi) = E
{∫ T
t1
U(Xt1,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + g(X
t1,x
T ,K − piT )
}
= E
{∫ t2
t1
U(Xt1,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + E
[ ∫ T
t2
U(Xt2,X
t1,x
t2 , Q
p˜i,Q
pi,q
t2
s )dpis + g(X
t2 ,X
t1,x
t2
T ,K − p˜iT )
∣∣∣Ft2]}
= E
{∫ t2
t1
U(Xt1,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + J
0(t2,X
t1,x
t2
, pit2 , Q
pi,q
t2
; p˜i)
}
≥ E
{∫ t2
t1
U(Xt1,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + V (t2,X
t1,x
t2
, pit2 , Q
pi,q
t2
)
}
.
We remark that in the above the last equality can be proved rigorously by using the notion of
regular conditional probability distribution. Since the argument would be rather lengthy but
more or less standard, we omit the details. Now take infimum over pi ∈ A cad(t1, k, q) on both sides
of above, we obtain V (t1, x, k, q) ≥ V˜ (t1, x, k, q).
To prove the opposite inequality, we first fix ε > 0, and consider a countable partition {Oi}∞i=1
of O¯ and (xi, ki, qi) ∈ Oi, i = 1, 2 · · · , such that, for any (x, k, q) ∈ Oi, it holds that |x − xi| ≤ ε,
ki − ε ≤ k ≤ ki, and qi ≤ q ≤ qi + ε. Now for each i, choose pii ∈ A cad(t2, ki, qi) such that
J0(t2, xi, ki, qi;pi
i) ≤ V (t2, xi, ki, qi) + ε.
For any (x, k, q) ∈ Oi, note that pii − ki + k ∈ A cad(t2, k, qi) ⊂ A cad(t2, k, q). Then, by (5.1), (5.3),
(5.4), and applying Proposition 5.1, for a generic constant C we have
J0(t2, x, k, q;pi
i − ki + k) ≤ J0(t2, xi, ki, q;pii) + Cε ≤ J0(t2, xi, ki, qi;pii) + Cε
≤ V (t2, xi, ki, qi) + Cε ≤ V (t2, x, k, q) + Cε. (5.7)
Now for any pi ∈ A cad(t1, k, q), define a new strategy p˜i:
p˜is := pis1[t1,t2](s) +
[∑
i
[piis − ki + pit2 ]1Di(Xt1,xt2 , pit2 , Qpi,qt2 )
]
1(t2,T ](s).
It is clear that p˜it1 = k, p˜i is continuous and non-decreasing on [t, T ], and p˜iT ≤ piiT ≤ K on each
Oi. Moreover, Q
p˜i,q
s = Q
pi,q
s ≥ 0 for s ∈ [t1, t2], and for s ∈ [t2, T ], on Oi we have
Qp˜i,qs = Q
pii,Q
pi,q
t2
s ≥ Qpii,qis ≥ 0.
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Thus p˜i ∈ A cad(t1, k, q), and therefore, it follows from (5.7) that
V (t1, x, k, q) ≤ J0(t1, x, k, q; p˜i)
= E
{∫ t2
t1
U(Xt1,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + E
[ ∫ T
t2
U(Xt1,xs , Q
p˜i,q
s )dp˜is + g(X
t1,x
T ,K − p˜iT )
∣∣∣Ft2]}
= E
{∫ t2
t1
U(Xt1,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + J
0(t2,X
t1,x
t2
, pit2 , Q
pi,q
t2
; p˜i)
}
= E
{∫ t2
t1
U(Xt1,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis +
∑
i
J0(t2,X
t1,x
t2
, pit2 , Q
pi,q
t2
;pii − ki + pit2)1Di(Xt1,xt2 , pit2 , Qpi,qt2 )
}
≤ E
{∫ t2
t1
U(Xt1,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + V (t2,X
t1,x
t2
, pit2 , Q
pi,q
t2
)
}
+ Cε,
Now, since ε > 0 is arbitrary and pi ∈ A cad(t1, k, q), we conclude that V (t1, x, k, q) ≤ V˜ (t1, x, k, q),
proving the proposition.
As a corollary of Proposition 5.2, we shall prove the temporal regularity of V . We note that
this will be a crucial step towards the general form of dynamical programming principle.
Corollary 5.3 Assume (H1)-(H3). Then, for any 0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T and (x, k, q) ∈ O¯, we have
|V (t1, x, k, q)− V (t2, x, q)| ≤ C(1 + |x|)
√
t2 − t1. (5.8)
Proof. First note that the constant process k ∈ A cad(t1, k, q). Then, by Propositions 5.2 and 5.1,
V (t1, x, k, q)− V (t2, x, k, q) ≤ E{V (t2,Xt1,xt2 , k,Qk,qt2 )} − V (t2, x, k, q)
≤ CE{|Xt1,xt2 − x|+ |Qk,qt2 − q|}.
Next, recall from §2 that the dynamics of Q (see (2.3)) is driven by the compound Poisson process
Y , whose jump size Λi’s and the jump times τi’s are independent. Then one can easily check:
E{|Xt1,xt2 − x|} = E
{∣∣∣ ∫ t2
t1
b(s,Xt1,xs )ds+
∫ t2
t1
σ(s,Xt1,xs )dWs
∣∣∣} ≤ C(1 + |x|)√t2 − t1;
E{|Qk,qt2 − q|} ≤ E
{ ∞∑
i=1
|Λi|1{t1<τi≤t2}
}
=
∞∑
i=1
E{|Λi|}E{1{t1<τi≤t2}} (5.9)
= E{|Λ1|}E
{ ∞∑
i=1
1{t1<τi≤t2}
}
= E{|Λ1|}E
{
Nt2 −Nt1
}
= λE{|Λ1|}[t2 − t1].
Consequently, we obtain
V (t1, x, k, q) − V (t2, x, k, q) ≤ C(1 + |x|)
√
t2 − t1. (5.10)
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On the other hand, since U ≥ 0 and V is decreasing in q,
V (t2, x, k, q) − V (t1, x, q) ≤ V (t2, x, k, q) − inf
pi∈A c
ad
(t1,k,q)
E
{
V (t2,X
t1,x
t2
, pit2 , Q
pi,q
t2
)
}
= sup
pi∈A c
ad
(t1,k,q)
E
{
V (t2, x, k, q) − V (t2,Xt1,xt2 , pit2 , Qpi,qt2 )
}
≤ C sup
pi∈A c
ad
(t1,k,q)
E
{
|Xt1,xt2 − x|+ [Qpi,qt2 − q]+
}
= CE
{
|Xt1,xt2 − x|+ [Qk,qt2 − q]+
}
≤ C(1 + |x|)√t2 − t1,
where the last inequality is due to (5.9). This, together with (5.10), leads to (5.8).
To conclude this section we give a general version of the dynamic programming principle.
Denote Tt to be all the F-stopping times taking values in (t, T ].
Theorem 5.4 Assume (H1)-(H3). Then, for any (t, x, k, q) ∈ [0, T ) × O¯ and any τ ∈ Tt,
V (t, x, k, q) = inf
pi∈A c
ad
(t,k,q)
E
{∫ τ
t
U(Xt,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + V (τ,X
t,x
τ , piτ , Q
pi,q
τ )
}
. (5.11)
Proof. For each pi ∈ A cad(t, k, q) and τ ∈ Tt, denote I(pi, τ) be the expectation on the right side
of (5.11). Following the arguments in Proposition 5.2 one can easily show that V (t, x, k, q) ≥
infpi∈A c
ad
(t,k,q) I(pi, τ). So it suffices to prove the reversed inequality:
V (t, x, k, q) ≤ inf
pi∈A c
ad
(t,k,q)
I(pi, τ). (5.12)
We first assume that τ ∈ Tt takes only finitely many values t < t1 < · · · < tm ≤ T . We prove
(5.12) by induction on m. When m = 1, (5.12) follows from Proposition 5.2. Now assume that
(5.12) holds for m− 1, and that τ takes m values. For any pi ∈ A cad(t, k, q), we have
I(pi, τ) = E
{∫ t1
t
U(Xt,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + V (t1,X
t,x
t1
, pit1 , Q
pi,q
t1
)1{τ=t1}
+
[ ∫ τ
t1
U(Xt,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + V (τ,X
t,x
τ , piτ , Q
pi,q
τ )
]
1{τ>t1}
}
.
Note that {τ > t1} ∈ Ft1 and τ takes only m− 1 values on {τ > t1}. By inductional hypothesis
we have
I(pi, τ) = E
{∫ t1
t
U(Xt,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + V (t1,X
t,x
t1
, pit1 , Q
pi,q
t1
)1{τ=t1}
+E
[ ∫ τ
t1
U(Xt,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + V (τ,X
t,x
τ , piτ , Q
pi,q
τ )
∣∣∣Ft1]1{τ>t1}}
≥ E
{∫ t1
t
U(Xt,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + V (t1,X
t,x
t1
, pit1 , Q
pi,q
t1
)1{τ=t1} + V (t1,X
t,x
t1
, pit1 , Q
pi,q
t1
)1{τ>t1}
}
= E
{∫ t1
t
U(Xt,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + V (t1,X
t,x
t1
, pit1 , Q
pi,q
t1
)
}
≥ V (t, x, k, q),
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where the last inequality is due to Proposition 5.2. Since pi ∈ A cad(t, k, q) is arbitrary, we proved
(5.12) for m, completing the induction.
To prove (5.12) for arbitrary τ ∈ Tt, we first find τn ∈ Tt, n = 1, 2, · · · , such that τn − τ ≤ 1n
and τn ↓ τ , as n → ∞. By previous arguments we see that (5.12) holds for each τn. That is,
V (t, x, k, q) ≤ I(pi, τn) for each pi ∈ A cad(t, k, q). Moreover, by definition of I(pi, τ) we have
I(pi, τn)− I(pi, τ)=E
{∫ τn
τ
U(Xt,xs , Q
pi,q
s )dpis + V (τn,X
t,x
τn , piτn , Q
pi,q
τn )− V (τ,Xt,xτ , piτ , Qpi,qτ )
}
.
Applying Corollary 5.3 and noting that pi is continuous we see that the right hand side above
converges to 0 as n → ∞. Consequently we obtain that V (t, x, k, q) ≤ I(pi, τ) for each pi ∈
A cad(t, k, q). This implies (5.12), and hence concludes the proof.
Remark 5.5 Combining Theorems 5.4 and 4.2, we have the following alternative version of
dynamic programming principle corresponding to the cost functional J1 defined in (4.13):
V (t, x, k, q) = inf
pi∈Aad(t,k,q)
E
{∫ τ
t
U(Xs, Q
pi
s )dpi
c
s +
∑
t≤s<τ
D(Xs, Q
pi
s ,∆pis)+V (τ,Xτ , piτ , Q
pi,q
τ )
}
. (5.13)
6 The HJB equation
In this section we shall prove that the value function, while not necessarily smooth, is a viscosity
solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of the optimal execution problem.
We begin by introducing some notations. For simplicity we often use the equivalent notations
for partial derivatives: ∂tϕ =
∂ϕ
∂t
. The notations ∂xϕ, ∂kϕ, ∂qϕ, and ∂xxϕ are thus obvious. In this
and next section, we denote by C1,2b ([0, T ]×O¯) the set of continuous functions ϕ on [0, T ]×O¯ such
that the partial derivatives ∂tϕ, ∂xϕ, ∂kϕ, ∂qϕ, and ∂xxϕ exist and are continuous and bounded.
For each t ∈ [0, T ), we introduce a new filtration:
Fˆt := {Fˆ ts}s≥0 := {FWs ∨ FYs∧t}s≥0. (6.1)
Moreover, in light of the cost functional J1 in (4.13) and the DPP (5.13), we define, for each
(t, x, k, q) ∈ [0, T )× O¯, pi ∈ Aad(t, x, k, q), ϕ ∈ C([0, T ]× O¯), and F-stopping time τ ,
I(ϕ, pi, τ) :=E
{ ∫ τ
t
U(Xs, Q
pi
s )dpi
c
s +
∑
t≤s<τ
D(Xs, Q
pi
s ,∆pis) + ϕ(τ,Xτ , piτ , Q
pi
τ )
}
− ϕ(t, x, k, q). (6.2)
Next, we let τ t1 be the first jump time of N after t and ν is the common distribution of the jump
size random variables Λi’s. We remark here that, by definition (6.1) it is clear that (τ
t
1,∆Yτ t1) is
independent of Fˆt, and hence τ t1 is not an F
t-stopping time(!). Furthermore, we have the following
result that is important for our discussion.
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Lemma 6.1 For any fixed (t, k, q) and any pi ∈ Aad(t, k, q), there exists an Fˆt-adapted process p˜i
such that p˜is∧τ t
1
= pis∧τ t
1
, for all s ≥ t, P-a.s.
Proof. We first note that since pi is left continuous, we need only find a Fˆt-adapted process p˜i
such that, for any fixed s ≥ t P{p˜is1{τ t
1
>s} = pis1{τ t
1
>s}} = 1. This amounts to saying that given
s ≥ t, and X ∈ L0(Fs), there exists X˜ ∈ L0(Fˆ ts) such that X1{τ t
1
>s} = X˜1{τ t
1
>s}, lP-a.s. But
this last statement is more or less standard (see, e.g., [7]), we nevertheless give a brief proof for
completeness. We fix s > t and denote
Hs := {X ∈ L0(Fs) | ∃X˜ ∈ L0(Fˆ ts), such that X1{τ t
1
>s} = X˜1{τ t
1
>s}, lP-a.s.}.
Clearly, Hs ⊆ L0(Fs). We claim that Hs ⊇ L0(Fs). Indeed, note that Fs = Fˆ ts ∨σ{Yr, t ≤ r ≤ s}.
By a simple Monotone Class argument, for any X ∈ L0(Fs), we need only assume either X ∈
L0(Fˆ ts) or X = Yr for some r ∈ [t, s]. But in the former case we can choose X˜ = X, and in the
latter case we choose X˜ = Yt. Since in both cases X˜ ∈ L0(Fˆ ts), we conclude that X ∈ Hs. This
proves the claim, whence the lemma.
Now for any ϕ ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ] × O¯ we introduce the following integro-differential operators:
L [ϕ](t, x, k, q) := (∂tϕ+ b∂xϕ+
1
2
σ2∂xxϕ)(t, x, k, q)
+λ
∫
R
[
ϕ(t, x, k, (q + u)+)− ϕ(t, x, k, q)]ν(du); (6.3)
M [ϕ](t, x, k, q) := U(x, q) + (∂kϕ− ∂qϕ)(t, x, k, q).
The following lemma is crucial.
Lemma 6.2 Assume ϕ ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ]× O¯ and τ is an Ft-stopping time. Then it holds that
I(ϕ, pi, τ ∧ τ t1) = E
{∫ τ∧τ t
1
t
L [ϕ](s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s )ds +
∫ τ∧τ t
1
t
M [ϕ](s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s )dpi
c
s
+
∑
t≤s<τ∧τ t
1
∫ ∆pis
0
M [ϕ](s,Xs, pis + u,Q
pi
s − u)du
}
. (6.4)
where L and M are defined by (6.3).
Proof. For any Ft-stopping time τ we denote τˆ := τ ∧ τ t1. Let pi ∈ Aad(t, k, q), and let p˜i be
the Ft-adapted version of pi defined in Lemma 6.1, and define Q˜pis := q− p˜is + k, s ≥ t. Then, it is
readily seen that Qpi
τ t
1
= (Q˜pi
τ t
1
+∆Yτ t
1
)+, and thus
ϕ(τˆ , Xτˆ , piτˆ , Q
pi
τˆ )− ϕ(t, x, k, q) = ϕ(τˆ , Xτˆ , piτˆ , Q˜piτˆ )− ϕ(t, x, k, q) (6.5)
+
[
ϕ(τ t1,Xτ t
1
, p˜iτ t
1
, (Q˜piτ t
1
+∆Yτ t
1
)+)− ϕ(τ t1,Xτ t
1
, p˜iτ t
1
, Q˜piτ t
1
)
]
1{τ t
1
≤τ}.
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Since (X, p˜i, Q˜pi), τ t1, ∆Yτ t1 are independent, we have
E
{[
ϕ(τ t1,Xτ t
1
, p˜iτ t
1
, (Q˜pi
τ t
1
+∆Yτ t
1
)+)− ϕ(τ t1,Xτ t
1
, p˜iτ t
1
, Q˜pi
τ t
1
)
]
1{τ t
1
≤τ}
}
= E
{∫ τ
t
λe−λ(s−t)ds
∫
R
[
ϕ(s,Xs, p˜is, (Q˜
pi
s + u)
+)− ϕ(s,Xs, p˜is, Q˜pis )
]
ν(du)
}
(6.6)
= E
{
λ
∫ τ
t
1{τ t
1
≥s}
∫
R
[
ϕ(s,Xs, p˜is, (Q˜
pi
s + u)
+)− ϕ(s,Xs, p˜is, Q˜pis )
]
ν(du)ds
}
= E
{
λ
∫ τˆ
t
∫
R
[
ϕ(s,Xs, pis, (Q
pi
s + u)
+)− ϕ(s,Xs, pis, Qpis )
]
ν(du)ds
}
.
Here we used the fact that Q˜pis = Q
pi
s , t ≤ s < τˆ . Furthermore, applying Itoˆ’s formula we have
E
{
ϕ(τˆ , Xτˆ , piτˆ , Q˜
pi
τˆ )− ϕ(t, x, k, q)
}
= E
{∫ τˆ
t
[
∂tϕ+ b∂xϕ+
1
2
σ2∂xxϕ
]
(s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s )ds +
∫ τˆ
t
[
∂kϕ− ∂qϕ
]
(s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s )dpi
c
s
+
∑
t≤s<τˆ
∫ ∆pis
0
[
∂kϕ− ∂qϕ
]
(s,Xs, pis + u,Q
pi
s − u)du
}
. (6.7)
Plugging (6.6), (6.7) into (6.5), and then plugging (6.5), (4.5) into (6.2), we obtain (6.4).
It is worth noting that if we use the continuous strategy pi ∈ A cad(t, x, k, q), then (6.2) and
(6.4) become
I(ϕ, pi, τ) := E
{∫ τ
t
U(Xs, Q
pi
s )dpis + ϕ(τ,Xτ , piτ , Q
pi
τ )
}
− ϕ(t, x, k, q) (6.8)
= E
{∫ τ
t
L [ϕ](s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s )ds +
∫ τ
t
M [ϕ](s,Xs, pis, Q˜
pi
s )dpis
}
, (6.9)
respectively. Clearly, (6.8) is valid even when ϕ is not smooth. In fact, by Theorem 5.4 we have
0 = inf
pi∈A c
ad
(t,x,k,q)
I(V, pi, τ). (6.10)
Furthermore, if V ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ] × O¯), then we may plug (6.9) into (6.10) and deduce the
following Quasi-Variational-Inequality (QVI):
min
(
L [V ], M [V ]
)
(t, x, k, q) = 0, (t, x, k, q) ∈ [0, T )×O, (6.11)
with the terminal-boundary conditions:
V (T, x, k, q) = g(x,K − k); V (t, x,K, q) = 0; L [V ](t, x, k, 0) = 0. (6.12)
As we will see in next section, in this case V is indeed the unique classical solution of the QVI
(6.11) and (6.12).
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In general, however, V may not be smooth. We thus need to make use of the notion of the
viscosity solution. To this end, let us denote, for (t, x, k, q) ∈ [0, T )× R+ × [0,K)× R¯+,
A (t, x, k, q) :=
{
ϕ ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ]× O¯) : [V − ϕ](t, x, k, q) = 0
}
;
A (t, x, k, q) :=
{
ϕ ∈ A(t, x, k, q) : V − ϕ attains a global maximum at (t, x, k, q)
}
; (6.13)
A (t, x, k, q) :=
{
ϕ ∈ A(t, x, k, q) : V − ϕ attains a global minimum at (t, x, k, q)
}
.
Definition 6.3 A continuous function V : [0, T ]×O¯ 7→ R+ is called a viscosity subsolution (resp.
supersolution) to the QVI (6.11)-(6.12) if
(i) V (T, x, k, q) ≥ (resp. ≤)g(x,K − k) and V (t, x,K, q) ≥ 0(resp. ≤ 0);
(ii) for any (t, x, k, q) ∈ [0, T )×O and ϕ ∈ A(t, x, k, q) (resp. A(t, x, k, q)) one has:
min(L [ϕ],M [ϕ])(t, x, k, q) ≥ 0, (resp. ≤ 0);
(iii) for any (t, x, k) ∈ [0, T )× R+ × [0,K) and ϕ ∈ A(t, x, k, 0) (resp. A(t, x, k, 0)) one has:
L [ϕ](t, x, k, 0) ≥ 0, (resp. ≤ 0).
Moreover, V is called a viscosity solution if it is both a viscosity subsolution and supersolution.
Our main result of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 6.4 Assume (H1)-(H3). Then the value function V of the optimal execution problem
is a viscosity solution of the QVI (6.11)-(6.12).
Proof. The terminal condition V (T, x, k, q) = g(x,K − k) is obvious. Moreover, note that if
pit = K, then pis ≡ K for all s ∈ [t, T ), as there is no need to purchase any more. Thus dpis = 0
for s ∈ [t, T ], and clearly g(XT ,K − piT ) = g(XT , 0) = 0. That is, V (t, x,K, q) = 0. So Definition
6.3 (i) holds (with equalities), and thus it suffices to check Definition 6.3 (ii) and (iii).
We first prove the viscosity subsolution properties. It suffices to show that, for any (t, x, k, q) ∈
[0, T )× R+ × [0,K) × R¯+ and ϕ ∈ A(t, x, k, q).
L [ϕ](t, x, k, q) ≥ 0, for q ≥ 0; M [ϕ](t, x, k, q) ≥ 0, for q > 0. (6.14)
In what follows we denote, for δ > 0 small, τδ := (t + δ) ∧ τ t1, and let C > 0 be a generic
constant that is allowed to vary from line to line.
We begin by proving the first inequality in (6.14). Let pi := k be the constant process. Then
Qpis = q for t ≤ s < τδ. By (6.10), (6.13), and (6.9), we have
0 ≤ I(V, k, τδ) ≤ I(ϕ, k, τδ) = E
{∫ τδ
t
L [ϕ](s,Xs, k, q)ds
}
= E
{∫ t+δ
t
L [ϕ](s,Xs, k, q)ds
}
− E
{∫ t+δ
τ t
1
L [ϕ](s,Xs, k, q)ds1{τ t
1
<t+δ}
}
. (6.15)
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Note that L [ϕ] is bounded and
P(τ t1 < t+ δ) ≤ Cδ, (6.16)
dividing both sides of (6.15) by δ and then sending δ → 0, we prove the first inequality in (6.14).
To check the second inequality in (6.14) for q > 0, let η > 0 and set pis := k +
(s−t)∧δ
δ
ηq.
Clearly pi ∈ A cad(t, k, q), p˜i = pi, dpis = ηqδ ds, and Q˜pis = [1− s−tδ η]q, s ≤ τδ. By (6.10), (6.13), and
(6.9) again, we have
0 ≤ E
{ηq
δ
∫ τδ
t
M [ϕ](s,Xs, pis, [1 − s− t
δ
η]q)ds +
∫ τδ
t
L [ϕ](s,Xs, pis, Q˜
pi
s )ds
}
≤ E
{ηq
δ
∫ t+δ
t
M [ϕ](s,Xs, pis, [1− s− t
δ
η]q)ds
}
+ CP(τ t1 < t+ δ) + Cδ
≤ E
{ηq
δ
∫ t+δ
t
[
sup
0≤θ≤1
M [ϕ](s,Xs, pis, [1 − θη]q)
]
ds
}
+ Cδ,
Here in the last inequality above we used (6.16) again. Now, sending δ → 0 in the above we can
easily deduce that sup0≤θ≤1 M [ϕ](t, x, k, [1 − θη]q) ≥ 0. The arbitrariness of η > 0 then further
leads to the second inequality of (6.14), proving the viscosity subsolution property.
We now turn to the viscosity supersolution property. We first check Definition 6.3 (iii). Let
(t, x, k) ∈ [0, T ) × R+ × [0,K) and ϕ ∈ A(t, x, k, 0). For any pi ∈ A cad(t, k, 0), since there is no
liquidity (q = 0), there is no possibility of trading, and thus it must hold that: pis ≡ k and
Qpi,0s = 0, s < τ t1. Then, by (6.10), (6.13) and (6.9) again, we have
0 = I(V, k, τδ) ≥ I(ϕ, k, τδ) = E
{∫ τδ
t
L [ϕ](s,Xs, k, 0)ds
}
.
Dividing both sides above by δ and then sending δ → 0, similar to the case (6.15) we can prove
Definition 6.3 (iii).
It remains to verify Definition 6.3 (ii). Suppose in the contrary that
c := min
(
L [ϕ],M [ϕ]
)
(t, x, k, q) > 0 (6.17)
for some (t, x, k, q) ∈ [0, T ) ×O and ϕ ∈ A(t, x, k, q). Then, applying Theorem 5.4 on τ t1 we can
find pi := piδ ∈ A cad(t, k, q) such that
V (t, x, k, q) ≥ E
{∫ τ t
1
t
U(Xt,xs , Q
pi
s )dpis + V (τ
t
1,X
t,x
τ t
1
, piτ t
1
, Qpi,q
τ t
1
)
}
− δ2.
Now let p˜i be the Ft-adapted version of pi, as was defined in Lemma 6.1, and Q˜pis = q − p˜is + k,
s ≥ t. For any δ > 0, define the following stopping times:
τXδ := inf
{
s > t : |Xt,xs − x| ≥ δ
1
4
} ∧ T, τpiδ := inf {s > t : p˜is − k ≥ δ} ∧ T,
τ ′δ := (t+ δ) ∧ τXδ ∧ τpiδ , τˆ ′δ := τ ′δ ∧ τ t1. (6.18)
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Then τ ′δ is an Fˆ
t-stopping time. Similar to the first part of Proposition 5.2 we can show that
V (t, x, k, q) ≥ E
{∫ τˆ ′
δ
t
U(Xs, Q
pi
s )dpis + V (τˆ
′
δ,Xτˆ ′δ , piτˆ
′
δ
, Qpiτˆ ′
δ
)
}
− δ2.
Now following the derivation of (6.15) we obtain
δ2 ≥ E
{∫ τˆ ′
δ
t
M [ϕ](s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s )dpis +
∫ τˆ ′
δ
t
L [ϕ](s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s )ds
}
. (6.19)
Since ϕ is smooth, we deduce from (6.17) that, for δ is small enough,
M [ϕ](s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s ) ≥
c
2
, (L [ϕ] + G [ϕ]
)
(s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s ) ≥
c
2
, t ≤ s < τˆ ′δ.
Thus it follows from (6.19) that δ2 ≥ c
2
E{piτˆ ′
δ
−k+ τˆ ′δ−t}. But note that piτˆ ′δ−k = δ on {τˆ ′δ = τpiδ },
this leads further to
δ2 ≥ c
2
E
{
δ1{τˆ ′
δ
=τpi
δ
} + ((t+ δ) ∧ τXδ ∧ τ t1 − t)1{τˆ ′δ<τpiδ }
} ≥ c
2
δ − CE{(t+ δ − τXδ ∧ τ t1)+}
≥ c
2
δ − Cδ[P(τXδ < t+ δ) + P(τ t1 < t+ δ)]. (6.20)
Finally, recalling (6.16) and noting that
P(τXδ < t+ δ) = P
(
sup
t≤s≤t+δ
|Xt,xs − x| ≥ δ
1
4
)
≤ 1
δ
E
{
sup
t≤s≤t+δ
|Xt,xs − x|4
}
≤ C(1 + |x|4)δ.
We derive from (6.20) that δ2 ≥ c2δ −C(1 + |x|4)δ2. But this is obviously impossible when δ > 0
is small enough, a contradiction to the assumption (6.17). This completes the proof.
Remark 6.5 (i) If the value function actually has the regularity V ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ] × O¯), then
instead of being a viscosity solution, it will be a classical solution to the QVI (6.11). Moreover,
by Theorem 7.4 below, we see that the classical solution is unique.
(ii) We should note that one may try to analyze the uniqueness in the sense of viscosity
solutions by following the standard techniques (see the classical reference [9]). However, since our
main focus is the dynamic equilibrium model of the limit order book, we prefer not to pursue this
in this already lengthy paper and will leave it to interested reader.
7 Description of Optimal Strategy
In this section we give a characterization of the optimal strategy. Our argument will be based on
the assumption that the HJB equation has a “classical solution”, which will not be substantiated
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in this paper, as it is itself a challenging problem. Our main purpose is to see the possible
structure of the optimal strategy and compare it to the usual optimal singular stochastic control
in the literature.
Our starting point is the following partial Verification Theorem.
Proposition 7.1 Assume (H1) - (H3), and that v ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ]×O¯) is a classical solution to the
QVI (6.11)-(6.12). Then v ≤ V .
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume t = 0, k = 0. By (4.13), it suffices to show that
v(0, x, 0, q) ≤ J1(0, x, 0, q;pi), for any pi ∈ Aad(0, 0, q). (7.1)
We remark that, for this proposition, we can actually utilize J0, namely considering only contin-
uous strategies. However, to analyze the optimal strategy later, we shall use J1 instead.
Recall that 0 < τ1 < τ2, · · · are the jump times of N . Denote τˆi := τi ∧ T . By the terminal
condition (6.12), we have
epi := J
1(0, x, 0, q;pi) − v(0, x, 0, q)
= E
{∫ T
0
U(Xs, Q
pi
s )dpi
c
s +
∑
0≤s<T
D(Xs, Q
pi
s ,∆pis) + v(T,XT , piT , Q
pi
T )− v(0,X0, pi0, Qpi0 )
}
=
∞∑
i=0
E
{∫ τˆi+1
τˆi
U(Xs, Q
pi
s )dpi
c
s +
∑
τˆi≤s<τˆi+1
D(Xs, Q
pi
s ,∆pis)
+v(τˆi+1,Xτˆi+1 , piτˆi+1 , Q
pi
τˆi+1
)− v(τˆi,Xτˆi , piτˆi , Qpiτˆi)
}
.
By introducing the filtrations lˆF
i
:= (FWs ∨ FYs∧τˆi)0≤s≤T and setting τ := T in (6.4), we obtain
epi =
∞∑
i=0
E
{∫ τˆi+1
τˆi
L [v](s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s )ds +
∫ τˆi+1
τˆi
M [v](s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s )dpi
c
s
+
∑
τˆi≤s<τˆi+1
∫ ∆pis
0
M [v](s,Xs, pis + u,Q
pi
s − u)du
}
≥ 0, (7.2)
thanks to (6.11). This completes (7.1).
In the rest of the section we shall find an optimal strategy pi∗ ∈ Aad(0, 0, q) such that (7.2),
hence (7.1), holds with equality, given the existence of the classical solution v of the QVI (6.11)-
(6.12). We shall remark though, although it is interesting in theory, the pi∗ is in general not
implementable since the costD in the expression J1 of (4.13) is not the real jump cost. However, as
was pointed out in Remark 4.3, this pi∗ will nevertheless provide us a very good and implementable
approximate optimal strategy.
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To help identifying the optimal strategy pi∗, we first provide some sufficient conditions. With-
out loss of generality, we shall only focus on the interval [0, τ1], corresponding to the term in (7.2)
with i = 0. To be more precise, we want to find pi ∈ Aad(0, 0, q) such that
epi,0 := E
{∫ τˆ1
0
L [v](s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s )ds+
∫ τˆ1
0
M [v](s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s )dpi
c
s
+
∑
0≤s<τˆ1
∫ ∆pis
0
M [v](s,Xs, pis + u,Q
pi
s − u)du
}
= 0. (7.3)
To this end, for any (t, x, k, q) ∈ [0, T ]× R+ × [0,K]× R¯+, denote
O(t, x, q) :=
{
y ∈ [0,K ∧ q] : M [v](t, x, y, q − y) > 0};
φ(t, k, q) := inf
{
y > k : y ∈ O(t,Xt, q)
} ∧K ∧ q. (7.4)
It is clear that O(t, x, q) is an open set in [0,K ∧ q], and φ is FW - progressively measurable,
non-decreasing in k, such that φ(t, k, q) ≥ k, and φ(t, k, q) = k for k ∈ O(t,Xt, q). We have the
following result.
Proposition 7.2 Assume all the conditions of Proposition 7.1 hold. If pi ∈ Aad(0, 0, q) satisfies:∫ τˆ1
0
1O(t,Xt,q)(pit)dpi
c
t = 0 and pit+ = φ(t, pit, q), t ∈ [0, τˆ1), P-a.s. (7.5)
then (7.3) holds.
Proof. First, denote Oc(t, x, q) := [0,K∧q]−O(t, x, q). Then the first equality in (7.5) implies:
dpict =
[
1O(t,Xt,q)(pit) + 1Oc(t,Xt,q)(pit)
]
dpict = 1Oc(t,Xt,q)(pit)dpi
c
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ τˆ1.
Note that Qpit = q − pit, 0 ≤ t < τˆ1, then by the definition of O in (7.4) we have∫ τˆ1
0
M [v](s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s )dpi
c
s =
∫ τˆ1
0
M [v](s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s )1Oc(t,Xs,q)(pis)dpi
c
s = 0. (7.6)
Next, when ∆pit > 0, by the second condition of (7.5) we have
pit+ = φ(t, pit, q) = inf
{
y > pit : M [v](t,Xt, y, q − y) > 0
} ∧K ∧ q.
This implies that M [v](t,Xt, y, q − y) = 0 for all pit ≤ y < pit+. Thus, by denoting y = pit + u,∫ ∆pis
0
M [v](s,Xs, pis + u,Q
pi
s − u)du =
∫ ∆pis
0
M [v](s,Xs, pis + u, q − pis − u)du = 0. (7.7)
Finally, we claim that
L [v](t,Xt, pit, q − pit) = 0 for t ∈ [0, τˆ1] such that ∆pit = 0. (7.8)
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We note that if (7.8) is substantiated, then since pi has at most countably many jumps, we have
E
{∫ τˆ1
0
L [v](t,Xt, pit, Q
pi
t )dt
}
= 0. (7.9)
Combining (7.6), (7.7), and (7.9), we prove (7.2).
It remains to prove (7.8). Fix t ∈ [0, τˆ1] such that ∆pit = 0. If pit = q, then (7.8) is the third
condition of (6.12). If pit = K, then pis = K for all s ∈ [t, T ], and thus v(s,Xs, p˜is, Q˜pis ) = 0,
thanks to the second condition of (6.12). Compare (6.8) and (6.9), one can easily check (7.8).
Now assume pit < K ∧ q, then
pit = pit+ = φ(t, pit, q) = inf
{
y > pit : y ∈ O(t,Xt, q)
}
.
That is, pit ∈ O¯(t,Xt, q). But note that as the solution to the variational inequality (6.11), it is
easy to see that L [v](t,Xt, y, q − y) = 0 holds whenever M [v](t,Xt, y, q − y) > 0, namely, for
any y ∈ O(t,Xt, q). The continuity of v then renders that L[v](t,Xt, y, q − y) = 0 on O¯(t,Xt, q).
Consequently, (7.8) holds. This proves (7.9), whence the theorem.
We next show that such pi indeed exists. Fix (x, q). In light of Proposition 7.2 we introduce:
A0 =
{
pi ∈ Aad(0, 0, q) :
∫ τˆ1
0
1O(t,Xt,q)(pit)dpi
c
t = 0, pit+ ≤ φ(t, pit, q), t ∈ [0, τˆ1), P-a.s.
}
. (7.10)
Clearly, pit ≡ 0 ∈ A0, thus A0 6= ∅. We shall construct the optimal strategy from this set.
Proposition 7.3 Assume all the conditions of Proposition 7.1 hold. Then there exists pi ∈ A0 ⊂
Aad(0, 0, q) satisfying (7.5), and consequently (7.3) holds.
Proof. We shall prove the existence by using Zorn’s lemma. To this end, we introduce a partial
order in A0:
pi1 ≺ pi2 if and only if pi1t ≤ pi2t for all t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s. (7.11)
We claim that every totally ordered subset in A0 has an upper bound in A0. Indeed, let {pii}i∈I ⊆
A0 be a totally ordered subset, where the index set I could be uncountable. Denoting QT to be
the set of all rationals in [0, T ], we define
pir := esssup
i∈I
piir, ∀r ∈ QT . (7.12)
Since {pii} is totally ordered, by a standard argument we can find a sequence pin = piin , in ∈ I,
n = 1, 2, · · · , such that pin’s are non-decreasing in n; and
lim
n
pinr = esssup
i∈I
piir = pir, ∀r ∈ QT . (7.13)
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We then define pit := limrրt,r∈QT pir, for all t ∈ (0, T ]. We shall prove that pi ∈ A0, and therefore
an upper bound of {pii}. Clearly pi is F-adapted, non-decreasing, left continuous, and pi0 = 0,
piT ≤ K. Moreover, since Qpin ≥ 0, clearly Qpir ≥ 0 for all r ∈ QT , which implies Qpit ≥ 0 for all
t ∈ [0, T ] and thus pi ∈ Aad(0, 0, q).
We now check that pi satisfies the two requirements of A0. Since there is no stochastic integral
involved, in what follows we shall fix ω ∈ Ω, modulo a P-null set, if necessary.
(i) We first show that
∫ τˆ1
0 1O(t,Xt,q)(pit)dpi
c
t = 0. Indeed, since pi has at most countably many
jumps, it suffices to show that
∫ τˆ1
0
1O(t,Xt,q)(pit)1{∆pit=0}dpi
c
t = 0.
Now for any t ∈ [0, τˆ1) such that ∆pit = 0 and pit ∈ O(t,Xt, q), by (7.4) we have M [v](t,Xt, pit, q−
pit) > 0. By the continuity of M [v], there exists ε > 0 such that
(a) M [v](s,Xs, y, q − y) > 0, for all s ∈ [(t− ε) ∨ 0, (t+ ε) ∧ τˆ1]; and
(b) y ∈ [(pit − ε) ∨ 0, (pit + ε) ∧K ∧ q].
Since pi is continuous at t, there exists rationals r1, r2 such that (t − ε) ∨ 0 ≤ r1 < t < r2 ≤
(t + ε) ∧ τˆ1 and pit − ε3 ≤ pir1 ≤ pit ≤ pir2 ≤ pit + ε3 . Now by the monotone convergence of pinr , in
the spirit of Dini’s lemma, there exists n0 such that, for all n ≥ n0, |pins − pis| ≤ ε for s ∈ [r1, r2].
This implies M [v](s,Xs, pi
n
s , q−pins ) > 0, and thus pins ∈ O(s,Xs, q), for all s ∈ [r1, r2] and n ≥ n0.
Since pin ∈ A0, then
∫ r2
r1
d(pin)ct = 0 and pi
n
s+ ≤ φ(s,Xs, pins ) = pins . That is, pin is a constant on
[r1, r2] for all n ≥ n0. Then pi is also a constant on [r1, r2], and therefore,
∫ r2
r1
1O(t,Xt,q)(pit)dpi
c
t = 0.
Since t is arbitrary, we prove the desired property.
(ii) We next show that pit+ ≤ φ(t, pit, q) for t ∈ [0, τˆ1). For any y ∈ (pit,K ∧ q) such that
M [v](t,Xt, y, q − y) > 0. By the continuity of M [v], there exists 0 < ε < τˆ1 − t such that
M [v](s,Xs, y, q − y) > 0 for all s ∈ [t, t+ ε]. We claim that
pins ≤ y, s ∈ [t, t+ ε], for all n. (7.14)
Note that if (7.14) is true, then clearly pis ≤ y for s ∈ [t, t + ε], which implies that pit+ ≤ y. By
the arbitrariness of y, we obtain pit+ ≤ φ(t, pit, q).
To see (7.14), suppose in the contrary that t˜n := inf{s ≥ t : pins > y} < t + ε. Then
pin
t˜n
≤ y ≤ pin
t˜n+
. Since pin ∈ A0, we have pint˜n+ ≤ φ(t˜n, pi
n
t˜n
, q) ≤ y, and thus pin
t˜n+
= y. Note that
M [v](t˜n,Xt˜n , y, q − y) > 0, then there exists εn > 0 such that M [v](s,Xs, pins , q − pins ) > 0 for all
s ∈ (t˜n, t˜n + εn). This implies that pins ∈ O(s,Xs, q) and φ(s, pins , q) = pins . Now recall again that
pin ∈ A0, then we have d(pin)cs = 0 and ∆pins = 0 for all s ∈ (t˜n, t˜n + εn). Therefore, pins = y for all
s ∈ (t˜n, t˜n + εn), contradicting with the definition of t˜n.
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Summarizing, we have shown that every totally ordered subset of A0 has an upper bound.
Therefore, applying Zorn’s Lemma, we conclude that A0 has a maximal element in A0, denoted
by pi∗. We claim that pi∗ does satisfy (7.5). Indeed, by its construction it suffices to prove
pi∗t+ = φ(t, pi
∗
t , q), ∀t ∈ [0, τˆ1), P-a.s. (7.15)
Suppose not, then c := φ(t, pi∗t , q)− pi∗t+ > 0. Define
τ := inf{s > t : pi∗s ≥ pi∗t+ + c} ∧ τˆ1,
pˆi∗s := pi
∗
s1[0,t](s) + [pi
∗
t+ + c]1(t,τ ](s) + [pi
∗
s ∨ (pi∗t+ + c)]1(τ,T ](s), s ∈ [0, T ].
It is straightforward to check that pˆi∗ ∈ A0, pi∗ ≺ pˆi∗, and pi∗s < pˆi∗s for s ∈ (t, τ ]. This contradicts
the fact that pi∗ is a maximum element of A0. This proves (7.15), whence the proposition.
We are now ready to state the man result of this section.
Theorem 7.4 Assume all the conditions of Proposition 7.1 hold. Then v = V and there exists
an optimal strategy pi∗ ∈ A (0, 0, q) such that v(0, x, 0, q) = J1(0, x, 0, q;pi∗).
Proof. Combining Propositions 7.2 and 7.3, there exists pi∗ ∈ A (0, 0, q) such that (7.3) holds.
Repeating the same arguments for each n, we may extend pi∗ appropriately on [0, τˆn] such that
n−1∑
i=0
E
{∫ τˆi+1
τˆi
L [v](s,Xs, pi
i
s, Q
pi,i
s )ds+
∫ τˆi+1
τˆi
M [v](s,Xs, pis, Q
pi
s )dpi
c
s
+
∑
τˆi≤s<τˆi+1
∫ ∆pis
0
M [v](s,Xs, pis + u,Q
pi
s − u)du
}
= 0,
which, following the proof of Proposition 7.1, implies that
E
{∫ τˆn
0
U(Xs, Q
pi∗
s )d(pi
∗)cs +
∑
0≤s<τˆn
D(Xs, Q
pi∗
s ,∆pi
∗
s) + v(τˆn,Xτˆn , pi
∗
τˆn
, Qpi
∗
τˆn)
}
= v(0,X0, 0, q).
Sending n→∞, and recalling the terminal condition in (6.12), we see that
v(0,X0, 0, q) = J
1(0, x, 0, q;pi∗) ≥ V (0, x, 0, q).
This, together with Proposition 7.1, completes the proof.
Remark 7.5 Based on Proposition 7.2 we can roughly describe the optimal strategy pi∗ as follows.
At each time t ∈ [τˆi, τˆi+1] between the two jump times of N , there is an “inaction region”
O(t,Xt, Q
pi∗
τˆi
), which is an open set, and therefore can be decomposed into open intervals. If
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pi∗t − pi∗τˆi ∈ O(t,Xt, Qpi
∗
τˆi
), then it stays “flat.” If it is at the boundary of O(t,Xt, Q
pi∗
τˆi
), hence the
boundary of one of the open intervals, then it either jumps to φ(t,Xt, Q
pi∗
τˆi
), i.e, the boundary of
nearest neighboring interval above it, if φ(t,Xt, Q
pi∗
τˆi
) > pi∗t , or move along with the boundary of
O(t,Xt, Q
pi∗
τˆi
), when φ(t,Xt, Q
pi∗
τˆi
) = pi∗t . In particular, when O(t,Xt, Q
pi∗
τˆi
) is simply connected,
then pi∗ essentially behaves like an optimal singular stochastic control. However, it is not clear to
us that O(t,Xt, Q
pi∗
τˆi
) will be simply connected, and consequently the optimal strategy may jump
multiple (even infinitely many) times between [τˆi, τˆi+1].
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